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VICTIMS OF TERRORISM:
Is it a 'Non-issue'?
Uri Yanay, Ph.D.
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Despite the growing 'detente' or because of it, the world faces the danger
of an increased number of ethnic, religious and separatist movements
that actively seek visibility, fearing that otherwise their case might be
overlooked. This may be one of the reasons terrorism is a growing
phenomena, causing injuries and death to people and significant damage
to property.
Most governments ignore victims of terrorism. Denying the problem
or providing scant help to victims does not solve the problem fairly. The
political nature of the problem and the multitude of damages caused
by terrorism requires legal entitlements and State resources to support
victims and compensate them.
The phenomenon of terrorism and its political, fiscal and value
implications are acknowledged as a social problem.
Informed almost daily of terrorist activities, 1 the eyes of the
public, paradoxically, seem to focus on the terrorists, while little
attention is paid to the victims of such events.
Despite the immense security efforts made to combat terror-
ist acts, no specific programs have been designed to either cover
civilian victims and their dependents, or to care and compensate
for their injuries, income and property losses.
This paper discusses the obstacles that exist in the process
of addressing victims of terrorism as a social problem.
Introduction
Despite the spirit of reconciliation and the growing social
and economic ties between countries in the world, or perhaps
because of these, the world faces an increasing number of ethnic,
religious and separatist movements which fear that unless their
visibility grows, their cause and claims might be forgotten.
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The relative power of any group in a democratic society
depends on its size. If opposed by the majority of the pub-
lic, minorities feel helpless. Wishing to pursue their cause and
remain on the public agenda, some of these groups engage in
what the chronicles call 'terrorist' activities. Terrorism is defined
(Oxford Dictionary) as a "Policy intended to strike with terror
those against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods
of intimidation."
Terrorist acts are targeted for visible, crowded public places:
town centers, public meeting places, aircrafts and ships, and
even buses and trains. By so doing, they injure and kill people,
and cause severe damage to property, (Bell, 1975).
Despite the physical and mental injuries inflicted upon vic-
tims, the short and the long-term implications of these injuries,
and the heavy financial losses it incurred, most countries do
not have a specific, comprehensive program designed for this
group of victims. Existing programs which could look after the
victims' health and welfare do not relate to damages and loss
of earnings inflicted upon these victims.
Since terrorism is a political crime, the political system
should be highly sensitive to its victims, yet ostensibly and para-
doxically, it is not. If governments assist victims of terrorism,
this assistance is based upon an implicit policy of providing
such help on an individual, discretionary basis.
The Arena
In most industrialized countries, the risks people face are
covered by occupational (work related) welfare or by contrib-
utory (voluntary or compulsory) insurance schemes. Unless in-
jured or killed in a terrorist activity while at work, victims are
not covered by their occupational welfare programs. Sick funds
and medical insurance schemes do not cater to such victims as
they do not cover the treatment provided to casualties of car
accidents, covered by private insurance.
Victims of terrorism or their survivors may soon realize
that even if existing programs partially cover their medical
and personal needs, (as under the National Health Service in
the U.K.) no one would compensate them for damages caused
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to property or loss of earnings. Neither would many private
insurance firms.
Private insurance firms normally cover the risks resulting
from crime. However, most of those private insurance schemes
and even National Insurance Institutes do not cover people or
property losses caused by terrorist activities, just as they do
not cover losses or damages due to war or civil unrest. Such
exclusions usually appear in the 'small print' of most insur-
ance policies.
It is, therefore, the State that covers the entire population
during war. Terrorism, however, is not considered an act of war,
and does not qualify civilians to receive either war damages or
pensions.
Programs aimed at helping victims of crime have been de-
veloped mainly by non-governmental, voluntary groups,
(Maguire and Corbett, 1987; Mawby and Gill, 1987). Some gov-
ernments have initiated such programs, covering little if any
direct, personal losses. Only basic medical costs and hardly any
rehabilitation would be offered. No funds would be paid to
crime victims to cover damages caused to property or extended
loss of earnings, (Elias, 1983, Abell 1989). It is true to say that
victims suffer twice: once from the traumatic event itself, and
the second time when they find out that there is little or no
help available.
In Northern Ireland (Greer 1989a 1989b) and Israel (Yanay,
1992), specific programs were initiated to insure physical and
mental treatment, rehabilitation, coverage of damages to prop-
erty and, to some extent, even loss of earnings due to terrorist
activities. These examples serve to highlight the lack of similar
programs elsewhere, despite the existence of terrorism.
The Pan Am jetliner which exploded over Lockerbie, Scot-
land in December 1988 is a tragic illustration of the catastrophic
outcomes of one terrorist act. In this case, all passengers and
crew members of the plane were killed, while all additional
eleven persons were killed as debris hit the ground setting
houses and cars on fire. The victims of this event were of thirty
different nationalities. Families in almost all parts of the world
lost their dear ones and their breadwinners. Financial losses and
damage to property were enormous, (Emerson and Duffy, 1990).
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The destruction caused in this single case had and will have
long-term, direct and indirect consequences for many individ-
uals, families and communities throughout the world. No one
government or international organization accepted the respon-
sibility to fully compensate the victims of this tragedy and their
survivors. Instead, a voluntary disaster fund was initiated.
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If and when the public is responsive and supportive, as in
the Pan Am tragedy, a disaster fund is initiated to help vic-
tims in a philanthropical, informal manner. In some instances,
the State would also make a contribution to this fund. By re-
sponding to an informal public appeal, the State avoids making
any direct, official commitment towards the victims and avoids
defining any legal 'right' of those victims. In fact, it releases itself
from officially addressing the problems. It sets no precedent,
and the sharp political 'sting' 3 which terrorism might bear is
thus partly neutralized. However, who will support a single
victim of a terrorist act? Those who never made the headlines?
Such cases might be overlooked, and the support from the
public, if any, might be too limited or short-lived.
As long as a government's implicit policy is to ignore a
social problem and not to acknowledge it, no program will be
initiated and no claim will be made, (Burt, 1983). It is suggested
that only with a growing public awareness of the problem and
acknowledging terrorism and its victims as a social problem,
more institutionalized solutions will emerge. However, there
are different types of obstacles in addressing the issue, leading
to the inability to develop specific statutory service programs
designed for victims of terrorism.
From a Social Phenomenon to a Social Problem
As a rule, explicit public policy aims only at acknowledged
and well defined social problems. Based on Merton (1971, p. 799;
Spector and Kitsuse 1977, p. 32-3), one can argue that a social
phenomenon becomes a social problem if three conditions have
been met:
A. A substantial discrepancy exists between widely shared
social standards and the actual conditions of social life.
B. The majority of people agree that this disparity between
Victims of Terrorism 25
'what is' and what 'ought to be' is disturbing and calls
for change.
C. There is a feasible, effective way to solve the 'actual
condition of social life' or control it.
Not all three conditions are met when considering victims of
terrorism in terms of a social problem. The first and second
conditions will be discussed later. The third condition, related
to a feasible, effective solution to the situation is probably the
most difficult obstacle to overcome.
Adopting such a solution requires overcoming three hur-
dles which are the Political, Fiscal and the Value perspectives,
(Tropman et al 1981, p. 3-5). According to Tropman, the value
perspective questions the limits of responsibility of the public
and the State towards individuals and families. The political
perspective deals with the need to design solutions that accom-
modate the different value orientations. The fiscal perspective
examines a policy in terms of its present and future costs, based
on the amount of fiscal discretion available in any particular sit-
uation. Each of these three interrelated perspectives can present
an obstacle to the formation of any explicit social policy.
Bulmer (1986, p. 5-6) claims that after the goals, values and
objectives related to a problem are set out, all possible solutions
should be listed, forming alternative strategies, courses of action
or policies. These alternative strategies are predicted, and the
probabilities of those consequences occurring are estimated and
compared to the goals and objectives identified earlier. Finally,
"a policy or strategy is selected in which consequences most
closely match goals and objectives, or the problem is most
nearly solved."
The central issue therefore focuses on the transformation of a
disturbing situation, an undesirable reality or phenomenon into
an acknowledged social problem. The process of acknowledging
a phenomenon as a problem is possible only after overcoming
the series of obstacles noted above. Failure to do so will prevent
acknowledging the problem, thus obstructing the formation of
an explicit policy and leaving the social phenomenon either
unresolved, or solved on an individually selected basis. The
discussion will focus on the following issues:
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1. Is terrorism 'nothing but crime'?
2. How disturbing is the phenomenon?
3. The value perspective.
4. The political perspective.
5. The fiscal perspective.
1. Is terrorism 'nothing but crime?'
Crime and terrorism are two distinct actions against public
order. However, in legal terms, terrorism is a purely a criminal
offence. To quote Stohl (1990):
"Host contemporary systems of jurisprudence do not recognize
'political' crimes as distinct from 'purely' criminal acts and thus
governments consistently portray acts which terrorists conceive
of as acts against the state for political ends as criminal activities
with purely individual motives" (p. 89 )
Still, crime fears public reaction; terrorism seeks it. Whatever
serves this end suits them. The more guarded a target, the
more of a 'celebrity' a person is 4, the greater the social and
psychological impact that attacking that target or person would
make, hence, the greater appeal to terrorists. Terrorism is aimed
at a public audience. Mickolus (1989) claims that:
"Acts of purely criminal nature with no political motivation what-
soever are not considered terrorism, thus, kidnappings solely mo-
tivated for money are not considered to be terrorist events unless
ransom monies are intended to finance the achievement of political
goals. Extortion threats not motivated by a political objective are
not classified by us as terrorism"(p. xiii).
The legal definition of terrorism helps politicians avoid ac-
knowledging the problem. Politicians may prefer to say that
terrorism does not exist by indicating that terrorists are simply
common villains and should be dealt with in court. While this
approach may help avoid admission of the existence of a social
problem, the public may feel uneasy with such an approach. Af-
ter all, the public can differentiate between criminals who want
to benefit themselves, and those who aim at a social, political
end. These questions are not easy to answer and thereby act as
a disincentive, an obstacle for setting policy regarding victims
of terrorism.
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2. How disturbing is the phenomenon?
As noted earlier, for defining a situation as a 'social prob-
lem', Merton (1971) claims that a substantial discrepancy be-
tween widely shared social standards and the actual conditions
of social life should exist. According to this definition, unless
terrorism is universally seen by the public as an unbearable
situation, no such discrepancy would exist. There would be no
significant disparity between 'what is' and what people think
'ought to be'.
Terrorism and terrorist activities are viewed differently in
various societies and at different times. Cline and Alexander
(1986) claim that:
"Some states tolerate, appease, and frequently glorify terrorists as
heroes. Conflict of moral standards in the world community tends
even to reinforce the momentum of terrorism" (p. 9).
It could be hypothesized that acknowledging victims of terror-
ism as a target population is directly and positively related to
the level of terrorism in a given country and its impact on social
stability and public morale, and that it also depends on the way
the public judges the phenomenon and reacts to it.
In those countries which face political terrorism, it would be
defined as a social problem only if a workable solution to the
situation existed. The lack of a practical, effective and handy
solution may result in a fatalistic approach to terrorism. Cline
and Alexander (1986) claim that:
"Liberal democracies frequently have lost their resolve to take
the necessary steps to deal effectively with terrorism despite the
fact that these governments are aware of the dangerous and seri-
ously disruptive effects of terrorism on the quality of life in their
nations" (p. 9).
Such an approach may be reinforced by the media. In its am-
bivalence toward terrorism, it plays a role in influencing pub-
lic opinion. By showing that terrorism exists everywhere and
can neither be tamed or controlled, the media may reduce the
willingness to fight against terrorism or discourage attempts to
eradicate it.
In a provocative statement, Stohl (1990) claims that:
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"Political terrorism is theater. It is profound and often tragic
drama for which the world is a stage. Violence, death, intimi-
dation and fear are theatrical ingredients. The plot often involves
hostages, deadlines, and high level bargaining.., while the fear,
frustration and often anger have remained just below the sur-
face of public consciousness throughout the decade, an active
continuous attention has been lacking... the (terrorists), however,
achieved stardom as the villain Americans love to hate" (p. 81).
The media seems to be the 'terrorist's best friend':
"Terrorists rely on the media to further their terrorinspiring goal,
and the media utilize the terrorist's acts as necessary for a reward-
ing news item" (Bassiouni, 1983 p. 177).
The public may therefore develop an 'Immunization Effect'
(ibid. p. 187) as society becomes desensitized to violence and
accepts it as a fact of life, dissociating it with pressing social
problems.
Terrorism, therefore, would be acknowledged as a social
problem provided the value, political and fiscal perspectives
were addressed.
3. The value perspective.
Terrorism constitutes a value judgment. Terrorism is in the
eyes of the beholder. It has a local, rather than an absolute def-
inition, and a temporary rather than A long-term one. Old time
'terrorists' have become state leaders while those defined as
'terrorists' in one place may be acknowledged as heroic freedom
fighters in a different location or by different people.
The value perspective emerges from the overall perception
of citizenship, from State responsibilities to its citizens and resi-
dence. It can be argued that since the State holds the monopoly
over power, and is the only legitimate body to use force, it
is obliged to ensure the safety and security of its citizens. In
failing to do so, the State ought to compensate the victims of its
shortfalls.
If this is true regarding victims of crime, so be it regarding
victims of terrorism. While a reasonable person ought to be able
to steer clear of danger, one can hardly avoid becoming a victim
of terrorism. Terror can randomly affect any person at any time
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or place. Therefore, the term 'victim of terrorism' is not a neutral
one. It reflects the innocence and 'sacrifice' of the few hurt by
such acts, representing the collective.
Furthermore, one should consider victims of terrorism as
being agents of society. Perhaps like soldiers, they draw 'enemy
fire', thus exposing the existence and perhaps also the location of
opposition and its objective. If society is obligated to its soldiers,
it is consequently committed to the victims of terrorism. In the
long run, they both serve the public at large.
If, indeed, the value system views victims of terrorism as
innocent casualties, it could make a case for a clear, explicit
approach regarding those victims. After all, they were randomly
selected and victimized as representing a collective, a given po-
litical framework. They ought to be addressed by that collective
in a way that reflects and pays tribute to their personal sacrifice.
And if they were outsiders, non-members of the collective (as
in the case of innocent travellers and tourists) should not this
call be even stronger?
4. The political perspective
Politically, introducing explicit services designed for victims
of terrorism may indirectly, or even directly, imply the recog-
nition of terrorism, thus acknowledging an illegal, combative
opposition. Politicians and governments who are reluctant to
make such an acknowledgment would oppose any initiative
to establish a unique statutory rights or services designed for
victims of terrorism.
Politicians may therefore claim that the problem does not
exist, that it is rare and bears only temporary implications, or
that it is a very small and restricted problem that deserves little
or no attention, all to avoid terrorism as a public issue.
Acknowledging terrorism as 'harmful' may imply that it
is also 'successful'. This, no doubt, bears social and political
implications. Accepting State responsibility for the outcome of
terrorist acts and its victims, may indicate that terrorism not
only exists, but has also reached disturbing magnitude, thus de-
serving institutional, statutory reaction. Such recognition might
lead to undesirable political implications.
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This is the main reason why policymakers are reluctant to
acknowledge terrorism as a social problem. Moreover, cover-
ing one type of unlawful or illegal activity could yield social
pressures to broaden definition and entitlements to other areas
of risk as well. A citizen hurt through an unlawful activity
does not really care which group stands behind that specific
event, hence a growing pressure for additional, and perhaps
even unconditional coverage. Why then establish a precedent,
an initial program? And who will cover its unpredictable, but
likely high costs?
5. The fiscal perspective.
Crime has its direct and indirect social and economic costs
(Phillips, 1974:309, Le Grand and Robinson, 1984:127). The costs
of damages inflicted by terrorist activities are higher and less
predictable, (Mullen 1980; Beres, 1990). Costs are high because
terrorism aims at painful, costly targets; unpredictable because
surprise is the weapon of terrorism, and a handicap for the State
which must keep an ubiquitous, costly and constant alert.
Both combating terrorism and covering its damages may be
a heavy burden on any State budget, as it implies an 'open-
ended' commitment, the costs of which can be unlimited.
Fiscal considerations are also linked to the nature of the
coverage offered. If victims were to be offered only a nominal
coverage, program costs could be kept to a minimum. However,
under the circumstances, public opinion tight expect a level of
benefits higher than, say, in disability or survivors' pensions
as it ought to reflect a significant compensatory element. This
would require a generous level of benefits and support. Further-
more, covering direct and indirect, short and long-term damages
and losses might only increase the financial burden if such a
program would become statutory.
Furthermore, unlike other injuries, the State has to accept
the total, overall funding responsibilities for such a program,
without the ability to share it with others. In criminal or civil
cases, settlements can be reached, or the offender can be forced
to compensate the victim, (Chelimsky, 1981; Mawby and Gill,
1987, 301). This is not the case in terrorist cases.5
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Political, financial and value considerations act, therefore,
as disincentives to recognize victims of terrorism as posing a
'social problem'.
Summary
This paper focuses on people having suffered losses, in-
juries and damages as a result of terrorist activities. Whereas
the problems of victims of crime were acknowledged in recent
years, and one can witness the slow, yet expanding network of
services designed to help them, victims of terrorism have not
been acknowledged in this framework as they pose significant
value, political and fiscal obstacles.
Terrorism, unlike crime, has a profound political element as
it is aimed at the social system and the public order. Terrorism
wishes to undermine the State, its legitimacy and authority.
Policymakers might fear that institutionalizing services for
victims of terrorism will imply an acknowledgment of the phe-
nomenon. This would reflect a concern over the size of the
problem and its severity, thus forcing the State to acknowledge
terrorism and address its painful outcomes.
Reluctant to institutionalize programs for such purposes,
some governments encourage voluntary organizations to help
the victims of terrorism as they do for the victims of crime. Such
help, however, is limited by the scarce resources of voluntary
organizations. By no means would voluntary aid be sufficient to
pay the direct and indirect costs of covering short and long-term
damages to body and property.
A second way for a government to avoid the problem is by
helping each victim on an individual, discretionary basis. Such
a policy permits generous provisions to be made in one case,
and none to be provided on another. By maintaining such a
selective policy, social and distributive justice cannot be made
nor seen to be made. Victims who feel unfairly or insufficiently
treated by the authorities cannot pursue their case, make an
appeal or claim that the law was broken, as no such law nor
explicit entitlements exist.
A third way of politically reacting to the problem could
be preventing private insurance firms, by law, from waiving
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their responsibility in cases of terrorism. Such a step would
encourage individuals and families to make their own, costly
yet necessary arrangements to cover the risks of terrorism. This
would also imply that the problem is private rather than public.
However, as with similar cases in the social domain, the
process could ultimately yield a change. When terrorism reaches
a given magnitude and severely affects public life and morale,
policymakers cannot ignore the situation, and would acknowl-
edge the problem with the administration of a special assistance
program. This is probably why Israel and Northern Ireland have
established programs to cater to victims of terrorism. Policy-
makers probably felt that the public demands it.
Perhaps the fact that Israel and Northern Ireland have insti-
tuted their respective 'Prevention of Terrorism Act' symbolizing
the acknowledgment of terrorism, has also contributed to the
State's accepting responsibilities for its victims. The study of
these two laws and the public discussions that followed would
contribute to understanding the processes involved.
A possible implication of the analysis is that if a distinction
could be made between terrorism and its victims, this would
be helpful in addressing the latter. Whereas 'terrorism' itself
may not be recognized as a 'social problem', its victims might
be considered as such. However, it is difficult to make such a
distinction.
The question of what is being done in this area of policy
and services is left for further studies and empirical evidence.
It may be argued that, as in other areas of social policy, evil may
yield progress. Thus, paradoxically, the more terrorist activities
occur and the more dramatic they become, the higher the public
awareness of the problem will be, and the more institutionalized
the services for its victims will become.
The more sensitive the political system is to this problem, the
more generous the provisions made to those victims of terrorism
will be. Acknowledgment of the problem, public awareness, and
demand for action will influence the way the problem will be
defined and the manner in which policy related to it will be
formed. As things stand now in most countries of the world,
there is 'no real problem' of terrorism, hence no policy for its
victims.
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Notes
1. The author selected the term 'terrorist activities' (rather than Guerrilla,
Freedom Fighters etc). as a common name, without passing judgment or
identifying with any of the parties involved in a dispute.
2. In the Lockerbie case, an emergency appeal for funds raised the sum
of nearly four million pounds. As the tragedy occurred only two days
before Christmas, public response was warm and supportive. The British
government added its contribution to the fund, and so did Pan-Am. A
public board of trustees has suggested a formula to provide help. Part of
the appeal money has already been allocated to the Lockerbie community,
to victims in Lockerbie itself and in the USA.
3. This was done by the families of the Pan-Am victims. They put pressure
on the authorities to tighten security in international airports, while also
seeking someone to respond to their needs. Acting as an independent
group, not receiving or depending on government handouts, the families of
the victims felt themselves in a better and stronger position to act publicly
and politically.
4. This is the reason why targeting top officials or public figures results in a
strong public reaction, e.g. the assassination of the President of the West
German Employers' Association, the industrialist Hans-Martin Schleyer
and four of his trained body-guards, on September 5, 1977, by the Red
Army Faction (RAF). The kidnapping of the former Italian Prime Minister
Aldo Moro (on March 16, 1978) and his execution by the Red Brigades.
The murder of the First Earl Mountbatten of Burma on August 27, 1979
by the Irish Republican Army. All these had strong and impressive impact
on the public and its confidence. So did the IRA bombing of 'The Ship', a
hotel in Brighton where the Conservative Party convention took place. A
bomb exploded, almost killed the Prime Minister, wounding many of her
Ministers and other participants.
5. Such an approach has never been tested. It could be tried in the case of
Leon Clinghoffer who, tied to his wheel chair, was thrown into the sea by
a member of the PLO who hijacked the 'Achille Lauro' in October 1986.
The terrorist has been captured and charged. Attempts are made to make
the offender, personally, compensate the victim's survivors for his act, (see:
Cassese, 1989).
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